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Monopolies on Addiction: Should
Recreational Drugs be Patentable?
Marsha J. Ferzigert

Science without conscience is the death of the soul.
Franqois Rabelais
Pot will probably be legal in ten years. Why? Because in
this audience probably every other one of you knows a
law student, who will become a senator, who will legalize it to protect himself. But then no one will smoke it
anymore. You'll see.
Lenny Bruce (1967)
With the passage of the Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914,
America began the "War on Drugs."' The war appeared to falter
in the 1970s under the Ford and Carter administrations,2 but
the Reagan administration renewed it with full force, pledging to
"do what is necessary to end the drug menace."3 Despite
Reagan's vow, drug abuse in the United States has continued to
escalate, and the War on Drugs has accelerated in kind.4
As with any war, there are dissenters. Some believe that the
solution to the drug problem lies not in enforcement or interdiction, but in the legalization of recreational drugs. These
"legalizationists" began to publish articles advocating legalization
as early as 1969;' they were soon joined by distinguished individuals such as economist Milton Friedman, who first publicly
t B.S. 1992, State University of New York at Binghamton; J.D. Candidate 1995,
University of Chicago.
' Steven Wisotsky, Beyond the War on Drugs: Overcoming a FailedPublic Policy xvii
(Prometheus Books, 1990).
2 Id at xvii-xviii.
President Ronald W. Reagan, October 14, 1982, quoted in Wisotsky, Beyond the
War on Drugs at xviii (cited in note 1).
4 Id at xviii-xix.
' Rod L. Evans and Irwin M. Berent, Drug Legalization: For and Against 2-3 (Open
Court, 1992), citing New Guard (April 1969) (statement of David D. Friedman). For a
detailed history of the legalization debate, see generally The Background to the Debate, in
Evans & Berent, For and Against at 1-9.
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advocated legalization in 1972.6 The publicity surrounding the
legalization debate peaked in 1988 following Baltimore Mayor
Kurt Schmoke's pro-legalization remarks,7 and the debate recently made headlines again when Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders suggested studying the legalization alternative.8
Although numerous symposia9 and statistical studies"
have addressed this issue, the legalization question remains
unresolved. Some legalizationists argue that legalization would
promote individual liberty" and decrease the drug problem. 2
Others believe that the War on Drugs is "unwinnable" 3 and
that it should be fought not as a law enforcement war but rather

as a public health problem. 4 Those opposing legalization claim
that drug legalization would transform the United States into a

Evans & Berent, For and Against at 3 (cited in note 5).
US Conference of Mayors (April 25, 1988), Nightline (May 10, 1988), and The
Washington Post (May 15, 1988), cited in Evans & Berent, For and Against at 3 (cited in
note 5) (noting that Schmoke's remarks called for Congress to hold hearings on legalization). Schmoke has continued to advocate the "medicalization" of drugs. Despite the apparent unpopularity of this position, Schmoke was reelected Mayor of Baltimore in 1991,
winning 72 percent of the vote. See Dennis Cauchon, Drug War's PopularVoice, Unpopular Plan, USA Today 3A (Feb 22, 1994).
' See Pierre Thomas, Elders Drug Comments Repudiated: Surgeon General Suggests
Legalization Should be Considered, Washington Post A3 (Dec 8, 1993). Elders later issued
a statement stating that the comments were personal observations and not those of the
Clinton administration. Schmoke praised Elders for 'her usual courage." Michael Kranish,
Elders Stirs a Furorwith Legal-DrugsSuggestion, Boston Globe 1 (Dec 8, 1993). Washington Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly agreed with Elders that legalization should be studied.
James Ragland, Kelly Says Drug Legalization "Deserves Serious Consideration",Washington Post C1 (Dec 10, 1993).
' See, for example, A Symposium on Legalization of Drugs, 24 UC Davis L Rev 555676 (1991); A Symposium on Drug Decriminalization,18 Hofstra L Rev 457-942 (1990).
"0 See, for example, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 122 (1992) (prison drug
statistics), 221-226 (high school senior surveys), 230-233 (general attitudes about drug
use), 294 (drug availability in schools), 326-351 (drug use and abuse surveys by age and
type of use), 458-469 (drug crime and drug offense statistics). See also Louise G. Richards,
ed, Demographic Trends and Drug Abuse, 1980-1995 (1981)
11 See, for example, Todd Austin Brenner, The Legalization of Drugs: Why Prolong
the Inevitable?, 18 Cap U L Rev 237 (1989), as printed in Evans & Berent, For and
Against at 157 (cited in note 5).
2 See, for example, Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, as printed in
Evans & Berent, For and Against at 20 (cited in note 5).
David Boaz, Let's Quit the Drug War, NY Times A31 (March 17, 1988).
'4 Richard Cohen, March 10, 1988, quoted in Wisotsky, Beyond the War on Drugs at
xxiii (cited in note 1). See also Doug Bandow, War on Drugs or War on America?, 3 Stan L
& Policy Rev 242, 247 (1991).
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"society of zombies."' 5 The debate continues, yet few scholars
have examined the practicalities of a society with legalized drugs.
If recreational drugs were legalized, a legitimate market
would naturally develop for these drugs. As with any new market, competitors would fight for market share. Pharmaceutical
companies would most likely become the biggest players in the
new market because they possess the necessary equipment and
expertise to enter the industry. These companies would likely
create new recreational substances in hopes of realizing large
profits.
Ordinarily, such behavior would indicate the existence of a
healthy market. However, the recreational drug market would be
disconcertingly unique: because consumers of recreational drugs
often become addicted to these substances, the market would be,
in a sense, a permanent one. Traditional concepts of supply and
demand would not fully apply to this market because addicts
would be willing to purchase their "fix" at almost any price."6
Current patent law would exacerbate this problem. If the
federal government were to grant a patent on an addictive recreational drug, the patent holder would essentially possess a seventeen-year monopoly on a substance that an addicted consumer
must purchase. Such monopolies would not comport with the
generally recognized goals of legalization programs, such as making drugs available at lower prices and thereby eliminating the
need for a black market. In a post-legalization world, Congress
would need to pay careful attention to the effect that patent
policy would have on the legalization regime.
This Comment argues that recreational drugs, 7 if legalAlphonse D'Amato, quoted in George J. Church, Thinking the Unthinkable, Time
12 (May 30, 1988). See also Ragland, Washington Post C1 (cited in note 8), quoting John
Ray, a Washington, D.C. Council member ("What you're talking about is creating a bunch
of zombies. When you talk about legalizing drugs, you're talking about giving up on society.").
"
See discussion of inelasticity of demand at notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
1 This Comment discusses only purely recreational drugs, such as Ecstasy (3,4methylenedioxymethamphetamine, or MDMA) or crack cocaine. This Comment does not
address the patentability of currently legal drugs such as alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine,
except as a basis for comparison with currently illicit drugs. Furthermore, this Comment
does not express any opinion on the patentability of recreational drugs that also have a
medicinal purpose, such as marijuana or heroin. The public conscience is much less offended by the creation and use of compounds with a therapeutic use than by compounds
with no such use. Evidencing public sentiment is the classification of currently illicit
drugs in 21 USC § 812 (1981), which provides different criminal punishments for, and
otherwise distinguishes between, drugs with no currently accepted medical use (Schedule
I) and drugs with currently accepted medical uses (Schedules II-V). Although the effect of
legalization of medically useful recreational drugs is interesting and important, the issues
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ized, 15 should not be patentable. Allowing patents for recreational drugs would provide economic incentives for drug producers to
devote too many resources to developing new classes of recreational drugs. Allowing patents would also seriously undermine
any potential benefits of the legalization of recreational drugs.
Part I of this Comment examines the relevant areas of intellectual property law that might serve to protect an inventor's
property rights in legalized drugs: patents and trade secrets. Part
II argues that while trade secret protection would not be available to manufacturers of legalized drugs in most circumstances,
patent protection would be both available and useful to these
parties. Part III shows that while patent protection would be
available, Congress could act to deny such protection to legalized
recreational drugs. Finally, Part IV argues that Congress should
deny patent protection to legalized drugs.
I. BACKGROUND IN PATENT AND TRADE SECRET LAW

A. American and European Patent Law
This Part first explains relevant basic concepts of United
States and international patent law, including the problem of
"copycat" patents, an issue especially relevant to the problem of
"designer drugs" under a legalization regime. This Part then discusses the law of trade secrets, another area of intellectual property law that manufacturers might use to protect legalized drugs.
Congress created the United States patent system pursuant
to its constitutional authority to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts .... .,"' In the United States, inventors may obtain patents 20 for processes, machines, manufactures or composi21
tions of matter, or any "new and useful improvement thereof."
arising therefrom are beyond the scope of this Comment.
"SThis Comment assumes that drugs will be legalized rather than decriminalized.
Decriminalization means that recreational drugs become legal for private use and production, while the sale and commercial production of such drugs remains illegal. Legalization
means that the sale and commercial production of recreational drugs also become legal.
See Richard Lawrence Miller, The Case for Legalizing Drugs 137 (Praeger Publishers,
1991). Because selling or producing a decriminalized drug would remain illegal, the issue
of patentability would not arise for decriminalized substances.
, US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8. See also Graham v John Deere Co., 383 US 1 (1966).
2o The patents referred to in this Comment are known as "utility patents." Also available in the United States are plant patents and design patents. This Comment does not
address these patents.
21 35 USC § 101 (1984) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
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The holder of a patent has the right to exclude all others from
making, using, or selling the patented invention for seventeen
years.22
The patent system thus promotes scientific research and
artistic creativity2" by granting a seventeen-year monopoly in
exchange for disclosure of the invention.24 This limited monopoly
provides strong economic incentives to develop new inventions.2"
Indeed, without patent protection, there would be no way to eliminate "free riders"26 and hence little economic incentive to re-

search and create. Additionally, without patent protection, an
inventor has the incentive to keep new inventions secret, because

secrecy is the only way to maintain exclusive control over the
invention.2
title."). Any new and useful invention enjoys a presumption of patentability unless it encounters certain statutory problems. 35 USC § 101. See also 35 USC § 102 (1984) ("A
person shall be entitled to a patent unless" the invention is known or used in this country,
or patented or described in a publication in another country prior to invention by the
applicant; the invention is patented or described in a publication in any country or is in
public use or on sale in the United States more than one year before the application; the
applicant has abandoned the invention; the invention was patented in another country
before the United States application was filed; the invention was described in another
application by another invention before the instant application; the applicant did not
invent the applied-for invention; or the invention was made by another in the United
States before the applicant invented the invention.). For a helpful discussion of the requirements of patentability, see Graham v John Deere Co., 383 US at 6.
22 See 35 USC § 154 (1993) ("Every patent shall contain.., a grant to the patentee,
his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years ... of the right to exclude others
from making, using or selling the invention throughout the United States and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using or selling throughout the
United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.").
See US Const, Art I, § 8,cl8.
24 See 35 USC § 154.
2 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U Chi L Rev 1017, 1024-25 (1989).
21 See Yehuda Kotowitz, Issues in Patent Policy With Respect to the Pharmaceutical
Industry 1 (Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1986) ("While new information is
costly to create it is relatively cheap to disseminate or imitate. Thus unless inventors are
at least partly protected from imitation their incentive to invest in R&D may be severely
curtailed."). Certain types of inventions have a "public goods" aspect, thereby causing this
free rider problem. Many people may simultaneously use public goods, such as information, once they are made available. Thus, the owner of a public good cannot easily prevent
unauthorized third parties from using the good. Alden F. Abbott, Developing a Framework
for Intellectual Property Protection to Advance Innovation, as printed in Francis W. Rushing and Carole Ganz Brown, Intellectual Property Rights in Science, Technology and Economic Performance 311, 317 (Westview Press, 1990). People who do not pay for their use
or consumption of a public good are "free riders." "The fact that excluding free riders is
difficult or impossible for purely public goods disrupts the workings of the markets for
these goods." Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics at 109 (HarperCollins
Publishers, 1988).
27 See Erich Kaufer, The Economics of the Patent System 19, 41 (Harwood Academic
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Under United States patent law, to be patentable an invention must meet three basic requirements: novelty," utility,29
and non-obviousness.3 ° The novelty requirement provides that
the invention must be "new": it must not have been in public use
nor patented or described in a publication before its invention.3
Utility requires that the invention be useful.32 The non-obviousness requirement bars patentability of any invention that "would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains."33 In addition, United States patent law provides many
other prerequisites to the granting of a patent. 4
While similar in many ways to United States patent law,
European patent law imposes on an inventor an additional patentability requirement-morality. European patent law is controlled by the European Patent Convention ("EPC"); held in 1973,
it attempted to simplify the process of applying for patents in
multiple European nations. EPC Article 53(a), an interesting but
little-used clause,3" disallows patents on inventions against the
public morality.3" Other foreign patent systems have incorporated similar provisions into their own laws.3"
While not embodied in our statutory system, these ethical
considerations have surfaced in American patent law. In 1817,

Publishers, 1989).
28 35 USC §§ 101, 102.
29 35 USC § 101.

3' 35 USC § 103 (1993).
31 35 USC § 102 (a), (b).
32 35 USC § 101.

3 35 USC § 103.
3' For example, only the inventor may apply for a patent on a given invention. 35
USC § 101. Additionally, a written description of the invention must be contained in every
application. 35 USC §§ 111, 112 (1984).
" See John P. Sinnott, European PatentDecisions, in World PatentLaw and Practice:
Patent Statutes, Regulations and Treaties Index 5 at 4 (Matthew Bender & Co., 1987)
(showing no EPC decisions involving Article 53(a)).
" Article 53(a), European Patent Convention of October 5, 1973 ("Article 53, Exceptions to Patentability: European patents shall not be granted in respect of: (a) inventions
the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to public order or morality, provided that the exploitation not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited
by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States . . ").
" See generally Sinnott, World Patent Law and Practice (cited in note 35) (setting
forth the patent laws of many countries). See, for example, the patent law of the Republic
of South Korea ("[Inventions that contravene public order, morality or public
health ...

continue to be unpatentable."). J. W. Baxter, 2 World Patent Law and Practice

§§ 16-54 (Matthew Bender & Co., 1989). Many countries, however, have not enacted such
a provision. See, for example, Israel, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Turkey in volumes 2E, 2H, 21,
and 21 of Sinnott, World Patent Law and Practice respectively (cited in note 35).
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Judge Story declared that the definition of utility was in "contra-

distinction to [the] mischievous or immoral," 8 thereby inextricably linking patentability with morality. 9 Subsequent courts,
however, have expressed disdain for the notion that judges
should decide questions of morality, suggesting instead that these
questions should be left to elected officials.4 °
One problem in modem patent law that would likely surface
in a world of legalized drugs is the "copycat" patents problem.
Critics of the current United States patent system often claim
that the present system encourages too many "copycat" inventions; that is, inventors "invent around" patents by building upon
existing patents through similar but non-obvious relatives of a

recently patented invention. 4 This system allows different inventors to obtain patent protection on inventions that may appear to be identical to all but those highly skilled in the field.
In the current world of recreational drugs, a type of "inventing around" occurs with "designer drugs." These drugs are variants of existing drugs, acting in a manner similar to the existing
illegal drug42 but different enough to fall outside of the illegal
drug statutes.4 3 Designer drugs are relatively easy to make and
potentially limitless in number and scope." Thus, upon legaliza-

'

Lowell v Lewis, 15 F Cas 1018, 1019 (C C Mass 1817) ("All that the law requires is,

that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or
sound morals of society. The word 'useful,' therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. For instance, a new invention to poison people, or
to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private assassination, is not a patentable invention.").
" Judge Story's definition has persisted into the 1990s. See Tol.O-Matic, Inc. v
Proma Produkt-und marketing Gesellschaft, 945 F2d 1546, 1552-53, 20 USPQ 2d 1332
(Fed Cir 1991), quoting Lowell v Lewis, 15 F Cas at 1019.
40 See Ex parte Murphy, 200 USPQ 801, 803 (Patent and Trademark
Office Bd of App
1977).
"
Kaufer, The Economics of the PatentSystem at 41 (cited in note 27).
'2 Kinfe K. Redda, et al, Cocaine, Marijuana,DesignerDrugs: Chemistry, Pharmacology and Behavior 164 (CRC Press, 1989) ("Designer drugs are analogs, or chemical cousins, of controlled substances that are designed to produce effects similar to the controlled
substances they mimick. By slightly altering the chemical formula of a controlled substance ... a new drug is created which will produce the high or euphoria the user
wants.").
' Drug dealers and illicit drug chemists create designer drugs by slightly altering
known compounds in an attempt to avoid federal regulation and control, while maintaining the structural component that is linked to the desired effect. Id at 165 ("Clandestine
production of drugs, so called street drugs, is intended to avoid federal regulation or control."). This practice is analogous to "inventing around" a patent.
" This phenomenon is based on the "structure-activity relationship," wherein the
structure of some chemical compounds is closely related to its function, creating families
of compounds with similar structures and functions. Opiates and hallucinogens are examples of such families. Id at 164-65.
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tion, manufacturers could conceivably "invent around" currently
illicit drugs and receive patents on a large number of similar
chemical analogs.
B.

Background in Trade Secret Law

Although it is the most straightforward method, patent law
is not the only way to gain protection for an invention. In most
states, trade secret law protects "any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over
45
it."
use
or
know
not
do
who
competitors
Manufacturers of newly legalized drugs may seek trade protection for these substances. The definition of a trade secret explicitly includes chemical compounds,4 and the patentability of
a compound does not affect its status as a trade secret.4 7
II. WHY LEGALIZED DRUGS QUALIFY FOR PATENT PROTECTION
Due to the ease of "reverse engineering" chemical compounds, however, trade secret protection would be either unavailable or useless for most new recreational drug compounds. On
the other hand, newly legalized drugs would satisfy all the requirements for patent protection, and patent protection would be
both available and useful for new drug compounds.
A.

Legalized Recreational Drugs Would Not Qualify For Trade
Secret Protection

Trade secret protection would not be useful to producers of
legalized recreational drugs. Because the law of trade secrets
only prohibits discovery and/or misappropriation of trade secrets
through improper means (such as a breach of confidence)," a

4' Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (1939). For a discussion of trade secret law,
see generally Stephen J. Davidson and Robert L. DeMay, Application of Trade Secret Law
to New Technology - Unwinding the Tangled Web, 12 Wm Mitchell L Rev 579 (1986).
'6 Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (cited in note 45) (stating that a trade secret "may be a formula for a chemical compound"). See also Uniform Trade Secrets Act §
1(4), reprinted in Melvin F. Jager, 2 Trade Secrets Law App 1 (Clark Boardman Co., Ltd.,
1992) ("Trade secret' means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process."). At least thirty-eight states and the District
of Columbia have adopted some variation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. See id at App
A2-1.
,7 Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (cited in note 45) ("A trade secret may be a
device or process which is patentable; but it need not be that.").
" Id at § 757 ("One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege
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competitor may lawfully obtain a sample of the compound and
"through inspection and analysis, create a duplicate, unless of
course, the item is patented."49 This process is called "reverse
engineering"-working backward from a known substance to
determine the process of creation and the starting materials. °
Chemical compounds are unlike Coca-Cola or specific colors of
paint, heterogeneous mixtures whose content is difficult to determine through chemical analysis."' A competent and wellequipped chemist can readily ascertain the structure of a homogeneous molecular compound, such as a drug.5 2 Thus, even if
one considered a certain formula for a recreational drug a trade

to do so, is liable to the other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his
disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or (c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of
the facts that it was a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means
or that the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other,
or (d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its disclosure was made to him by mistake.").
" K & G Oil Tool & Service Co. v G & G Fishing Tool Service, 314 SW2d 782, 788,
158 Tex 594, 603 (S Ct Tex 1958).
' Chicago Lock Co. v Fanberg,676 F2d 400, 404, 216 USPQ 289, 292 (9th Cir 1982),
quoting Sinclair v Aquarius Electronics, Inc., 42 Cal App 3d 216, 226, 116 Cal Rptr 654,
661 (1974) ("It is well recognized that a trade secret does not offer protection against
discovery by fair and honest means such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure or by so-called reverse engineering, that is, starting with the known product and
working backward to divine the process."). California, like most states, has adopted the
Restatement law governing trade secrets. Chicago Lock, 676 F2d at 404.
" See Douglas A. Skoog and Donald M. West, Fundamentalsof Analytical Chemistry
687, 689 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963) ("The difficulties encountered in the analysis
of real substances arise, of course, from the complexity and variability of their composition ....
[E]ach new component creates several new variables .... With each new step,
additional variables arise; and with this increase, a theoretical treatment of the problem
becomes difficult or even impossible."). See also James T. O'Reilly, Right to Know:
Cincinnati'sMore Righteous, Less Knowing Experiment, 52 U Cin L Rev 337, 339-40 n 14
(1983) ("But the trade name used for a mixture substance, such as the hypothetical
'Chemslurry'-an aqueous solution of (2,2-bis)dimethyl alkyl diphosphonate, colorant dye
and chronium [sic] disulfide, permits the manufacturer of Chemslurry to market the product without duplication of the product by competing firms.... In a number of common
applications, processes are used that mask the identity of key starting ingredients to
eliminate the threat of reverse engineering by a competitor's customary detection efforts.").
2 See Skoog & West, Fundamentals of Analytical Chemistry at 687 (cited in note 51)
("Thus, if every chemical analysis consisted simply of determining the concentration of a
single element or compound in a simple and readily soluble homogenous mixture, analytical chemistry could profitably be entrusted to the hands of a skilled mechanic; certainly a
well-trained chemist could find more useful and challenging work for his mind and his
hands."). See also Note, The Foreign Use of U.S. Patents: Damming the Flow of Downstream Products, 30 Colum J Transnatl L 145, 158 (1992) ("Specialty chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology products ... can readily [be copied] through reverse engineering.").
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secret, the protection afforded by state trade secret law would not
be useful. Rival pharmaceutical companies certainly possess the
resources, equipment, and knowledge to procure and analyze the
drug, thereby discovering its composition by lawful means.5 3 Because reverse engineering is not a defense to patent infringement, patent protection remains the only effective method
of protecting such chemical compounds.5 4
B.

Legalized Recreational Drugs Would Qualify for Patent
Protection

Legal' recreational chemical substances, other than those
that have been in the public use for more than one year,5 5 are
patentable under current law, as are tobacco- and alcohol-related
paraphernalia.5 " Given that these relatives of once-illegal recreational substances, such as ethanol,57 are now patentable subject matter, the current law does not prevent inventors from

patenting newly legalized, novel recreational drugs. The only
reason that such drugs are not presently the subject of frequent
patent applications is that producers have no incentive to develop
and patent products that they cannot legally market."

5' See notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
Katherine M. Todd and John M. Hession, Intellectual Property Law, printed in
Venture Capital 1991: Forming the Fund and Financing Issues 259, 308 (Practising Law
Institute, 1991) (available on Westlaw at 583 PLI/Pat 259). See also David Bender and M.
Elaine Johnston, Antitrust Aspects of Reverse Engineering,printed in Intellectual Property/Antitrust 1993 709, 717-18 (Practising Law Institute, 1993) (available on Westlaw at
365 PLI/Pat 709).
35 USC § 102(b).
" See, for example, Wooden stein with responsive emblem, Patent Number 5,156,283
(Oct 20, 1992); Tricyclic ether substituted ascetic acid, tobacco flavoring use thereof and
process for preparing the same, Patent Number 5,188,129 (Feb 23, 1993); Cigarette with
cellulosic substrate, Patent Number 5,203,355 (Apr 20, 1993); Processes for producing
flavor substances from tobacco and smoking articles made therewith, Patent Number
5,235,992 (Aug 17, 1993). It is unclear whether Congress would grant a patent for recreational drug paraphernalia. But see Embroidering tool, Patent Number 4,886,003 (Dec 12,
1989) ("Unfortunately, the use of such needle assemblies has been found objectionable by
certain governmental bodies and agencies because the tools can be disassembled and the
cannulation needle assembles thereafter used as illegal drug paraphernalia by unauthorized drug users.").
" See US Const, Amend XVIII (banning alcohol); US Const, Amend XXI (repealing
prohibition).
" There is some evidence supporting the idea that illegal inventions cannot be patented. See Whistler Corp. v Autotronics Inc., 14 USPQ 2d 1885, 1886 (N D Tex 1988) (addressing an application for a patent on radar detectors: Unless and until detectors are
banned outright, or Congress acts to withdraw patent protection for them, radar detector
patentees are entitled to the protection of the patent laws.").
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The effect of patentability would be especially notable for
designer drugs. Companies discovering new recreational drugs
would not only patent the particular compounds they discover,
but they would also seek to patent broad classes of compounds,
encompassing all conceivable variations of their compound with
the same active component.5 9 These broad patents would comprise an entirely new class of drugs 0 and prevent other companies from inventing around these drug patents without infringing.
The "doctrine of equivalents" would further frustrate efforts
by competitors to invent substances that do not infringe such
broad patents. This doctrine states that an item that does not
literally infringe a patent may still be found to infringe "if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain the same result."" Additionally, under the
doctrine of equivalents, infringement of a pioneer patent-"a
patent concerning a function never before performed, a wholly
novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as to make a
distinct step in the progress of the art"6 2 -would occur even
when the infringing product's characteristics "lie considerably
outside the boundaries of the literal claims."6 3
Moreover, even if a rival company could develop a literally
non-infringing substitute for a new class of recreational drugs,
the company probably would not expend the resources to develop
such drugs. The return on the investment for such a substitute
would likely be small, given the high probability that the holder
of the "original" would claim infringement.' Thus the available
substitutes for the compound would be few or none, thereby in-

" Such patents often include what are known as "Markush groups," named for Ex
parte Markush, 1925 D C 126, 340 0 G 839 (1924). Markush groups claim a genus, and
then provide a list from which the substitutent groups may be chosen. These Markush
claims can encompass thousands or even hundreds of thousands of compounds, covering
very broad classes. Robert Patrick Merges, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials
499 (The Michie Company, 1992).
60

This reason explains why this Comment presumes that new recreational drug

research will focus on developing new classes of compounds rather than new compounds

in a known class, such as opiates. The patents on classes of compounds will be much more
financially valuable.
6 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v Linde Air Products Co., 339 US 605, 608 (1950), quoting
Sanitary RefrigeratorCo. v Winters, 280 US 30, 42 (1929).
62 Boyden Power-Brake Co. v Westinghouse, 170 US 537, 561-62 (1898).
Merges, Patent Law and Policy at 701 (cited in note 59).
Id at 705 ("[Tlhe history of many industries... shows that outsiders with promising approaches have been held back .... These episodes testify to the blocking power of
broad patents .... ).
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creasing the ability of the patent holder to extract monopolyinflated prices from newly addicted consumers.
III. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY AND PRECEDENT FOR DENYING
PATENT PROTECTION

The Constitution empowers, but does not require, Congress
to grant patents. 6' Thus, Congress maintains plenary control
over the patent laws" and may restrict the patentability of a
class of substances, such as recreational drugs.
Indeed, Congress has restricted patentability in the past. The
Atomic Energy Act of 1964 (the "AEA"), Title 42, Section 2181 of
the United States Code ("Section 2181") states that "[n]o patent
shall hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is
useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or
atomic energy in an atomic weapon."6 7 Additionally, the AEA
revoked any existing patents on such matter."
Congress passed the AEA to "assure that atomic energy
makes the maximum contribution to the general welfare of the
Nation, subject to the paramount objective of having it make the
maximum contribution to the common defense and security."69
Congress cited as its authority for this pronouncement the clause
of the Constitution allowing Congress to "provide for the common
defense,"" declaring that there was "no doubt of the authority of
the Congress to exercise its powers to provide for any manner of
regulation needed to protect the national interests, and the interests of the public."7
Section 2181 provides precedent for disallowing patents on
recreational drugs. Section 2181 acknowledges that while the
Constitution provides for a patent system, it does not dictate the
scope of that system. Public concerns may override the interest in

Cali v Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F Supp 1120, 1124, 184 USPQ 293, 295 (E D NY
1974), afld, 535 F2d 1240 (2d Cir 1975) ("[Article I, Section 8] empowers but does not
command the Congress to grant patent rights .... ."); Giuliani v US, 8 USPQ 2d 1095 (D
Haw 1988), citing Cali, 380 F Supp at 1124.
" Mast, Foos & Co. v Stover Mfg. Co., 177 US 485, 494 (1900); McClurg v Kingsland,
42 US 202, 206 (1843). See also Boyden v Commissioner of Patents, 441 F2d 1041, 1043,
168 USPQ 680, 681 (DC Cir 1970); Giuliani,8 USPQ 2d at 1095.
"7 42 USC § 2181(a) (1973).
6 42 USC § 2181(b). The patent holders whose patents were revoked under this section received subsequent compensation. Id.
" Atomic Energy Act of 1954, S Rep No 1699, 83rd Cong, 2d Sess (1954), reprinted in
1954 USCCAN 3456, 3465.
7 Id at 3466.
71 Id.
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promoting certain inventions. Just as Congress used Section 2181
to further defense policy, it could deny patents to recreational
drugs to further legalization policy.
The non-patentability debate has encompassed other classes
of inventions as well. The members of the European Patent Convention seriously considered disallowing patents on living matter72 after the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO"), in 1988, granted a patent to the inventors of the "Harvard Onco-mouse,"73 the first transgenic animal74 to gain such
approval.75 The Onco-mouse was, however, finally granted a European patent.7 8"
The debate over the ethical issues and public policy concerns
inherent in granting patents on living organisms has direct applicability to the issue at hand. Commentators examining the patentability of biotechnological advances have recognized that Congress has the authority to limit patent rights in order to advance
the general welfare. 77 Robert Merges states that historically, the
inventions declared unpatentable for moral reasons are those
that have "posed a direct threat to a readily identifiable [moral]
norm .

. . ."7

Merges advocates a "sort of moral balancing test"

in which benefits and detriments to7 the public welfare would be
weighed to determine patentability.

72 See Debates of the European Parliament ("Debates"), 1992 OJ (Annex 3-417) 17

(Apr 6, 1992).

71"The Onco-mouse is a mouse that is genetically engineered to be susceptible to hu-

man cancer." Cynthia M. Ho, Building a Better Mousetrap: PatentingBiotechnology in the
European Community, 3 Duke J Comp & Intl L 173 (1993). The mouse is useful because

smaller amounts of compounds suspected to be carcinogens can be introduced into the
system of the Onco-mouse, with a much higher probability that the mouse will develop
cancer.
" "A transgenic animal is one whose DNA... has been changed by adding
DNA... usually from different animals or from humans." Margaret J. Lane, Patenting
Life: Responses of Patent OffIces in the U.S. and Abroad, 32 Jurimetrics Journal 89 n 1
(1991).
71 "Transgenic non-human mammals," Patent Number 4,736,866, granted to Philip
Leder and Timothy A. Stewart, Apr 12, 1988.

" The European Patent Office ("EPO") granted the patent on the Harvard Oncomouse, determining that its benefits in facilitating cancer research and treatment outweighed the EPO's concern over cruelty to the mice. Lane, 32 Jurimetrics Journal at 99100 (cited in note 74).
"' See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent Sys-

tem and Controversial Technologies, 47 Md L Rev 1051 (1988); Ho, 3 Duke J Comp & Int
L at 173 (cited in note 73).
71Merges, 47 Md L Rev at 1065 (cited in note 77). Merges cites gambling devices as
an example of such inventions, even when such devices were legal.
'9 Id at 1066.
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In comparing biotechnology policy to the AEA, Merges states
that the AEA was meant to "keep [information about nuclear
weapons] out of the hands of those who would misuse [it]. "s°
Legislation by Congress disallowing the patentability of recreational drugs would accomplish a similar goal-keeping recreational drug patent monopolies out of the hands of pharmaceutical companies who could or would misuse them, or use them in a
manner contrary to the public interest.
Merges additionally argues that even if one concedes that the
non-patentability portion of the AEA is based on morality, "these
weapons would still constitute a rare limiting case-a technology
we do not want to encourage."81 Because society might choose to
discourage use of this technology, the AEA's non-patentability
clause would provide precedent for declaring recreational drugs
unpatentable.
In summary, Congress has authority to include a non-patentability clause in legislation legalizing currently illicit drugs. Its
task, however, is to determine whether such a clause is appropriate. Scholars continue to debate the economics of legalization
without examining a major factor in that debate-the economic
incentives that would cause big business to become involved or
uninvolved in the recreational drug industry. Congress must examine this factor as part of any scheme legalizing recreational
drugs.
IV.

WHY CONGRESS SHOULD DENY PATENT PROTECTION TO

LEGALIZED DRUGS

This Part argues that once Congress legalizes recreational
drugs, it should make these drugs unpatentable. First, this Part
sets forth the goals of a legalization regime and posits that patent policy should further these goals. Second, this Part shows
that Congress, not the courts, should disallow patents on legal
recreational drugs. Third, this Part differentiates between newly
legalized drugs and substances such as alcohol and nicotine,
which do enjoy some patent protection. Finally, this Part examines the pharmaceutical industry, likely the largest player in the
legalized drug market, and shows how denying patent protection
to these potential patentees would best serve the goals of legalization.

8

Id at 1067.

a' Id.
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A. The Goals of Legalization
The underlying goals of a legalization regime are critical to
analyzing the patentability issue because the patent laws should
help effectuate these goals."2 Current legalizationists differ in
their views of what legalization can or should accomplish.'
However, a number of common arguments supporting the legalization of recreational drugs have surfaced.
Legalizationists first argue that legalizing recreational drugs
would eliminate, or at least severely cripple, the "black market"
in currently illicit substances.' The black market thrives for
two reasons. First, because consumers cannot acquire illegal
drugs in a legal marketplace, the black market holds a monopoly
on the sale of these drugs." Second, the profit realized from
selling illicit drugs" outweighs the risk of criminal sanctions
faced by dealers. 7 Legalizationists suggest that if recreational
drugs were legalized, then drug companies would engage in the
competition for consumers as well; the result would be an increase in drug quality and a decrease in price." Street dealers
would no longer earn exorbitant profits from illegal drug sales.
As Kurt Schmoke stated: "Elimination of black market profits
will effectively eliminate the market itself, and all of its atten-

"Patent law does not stand on its own, but rather is an integral part of the general
law system of the country concerned." M. van Empel, The Grantingof EuropeanPatents 3
(A. W. Sijthoff International Publishing Co. B. V., 1975).
' Among other things, different legalizationists claim that legalization will help U.S.
foreign policy; prevent the hypocrisy of distinguishing between tobacco, alcohol, and
drugs; protect individual freedom from drug searches and drug testing; eliminate the
black market; and stop drug-related crime. Church, Time at 15 (cited in note 15). Many
legalizationists want to drop criminal sanctions in favor of public health solutions. Cohen,
March 10, 1988, quoted in Wisotsky, Beyond the War on Drugs at xxiii (cited in note 1).
See note 5. For a general summary of pro-legalization arguments, see Ethan A.
Nadelmann, The Case For Legalization,as printed in Evans & Berent, For and Against at
19 (cited in note 5).
' Kurt L. Schmoke, Decriminalizing Drugs: It Just Might Work-And Nothing Else
Does, printed in Evans & Berent, For and Against at 215, 217-18 (cited in note 5).
86 Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18 Hofstra L Rev
501, 511 (1990).
8 Id.
" "Itis a simple matter of supply and demand: as long as demand exists on the scale
of the U.S. craving for, say, cocaine, someone is going to supply it, legally or illegally."
Church, Time at 14 (cited in note 15).
" Wisotsky estimates that in the 1980s, the street price of cocaine was approximately
$60-100 per gram at 25-35 percent purity. In 1982, by contrast, pharmaceutical cocaine
cost about $1.80 per pure gram. Wisotsky, Beyond the War on Drugs at 31-32 (cited in
note 1).
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dant evils" 9 such as drug-related individual, gang," and organized crime.""'
Legalizationists also believe that legalization would help
current addicts in several ways. First, it would remove the fear of
legal sanctions that prevents many addicts from seeking help.2
Legalization would also help remove the social stigma attached to
drug use or abuse, enabling those users or addicts who fear losing jobs or embarrassing their families to seek help.93 In addition, legalization would help addicts acquire drugs at lower
prices, reducing their incentive to steal.94 Moreover, government
regulation would result in safer, higher quality drugs, perhaps
preventing numerous deaths now caused by bad drugs. 5 Finally, after legalization, recreational drugs would provide a large
source of revenue through both taxes and savings on law enforcement.9 6 These funds could then be earmarked for much-needed
addiction treatment programs.
Legalizationists also believe that America's youth would
benefit from legalization. Recreational drug use would likely decrease after legalization by removing curiosity about drugs, especially among young people.9 7 Illicit drugs are "forbidden fruit,"

Schmoke, 18 Hofstra L Rev at 518, 519 (cited in note 85).
Three main types of drug-related crimes exist: psychopharmacological, or crimes
committed because of the influence of the drug; systemic, or crimes committed by traffickers and dealers to resolve disputes; and economic compulsive, or crimes committed by
users to finance their drug use. David Elkins, Drug Legalization:Cost Effective and Morally Permissible, 32 BC L Rev 575, 581 (1991). Drugs also produce 'frustration crime':
crimes committed by ex-convicts so debased and alienated by a criminal justice system
that does not provide for treatment of addiction that they no longer see any reason not to
live up to society's image of them as worthless. Joseph P. Kane, The Challenge of Legalizing Drugs, America 61 (Aug 8, 1992).
" The President's Commission on Organized Crime estimates that more than seventy
drug market murders take place each year in Miami alone. James Ostrowski, The Moral
and PracticalCase for Drug Legalization, 18 Hofstra L Rev 607, 650 (1990). A nationwide
estimate based on extrapolation of this data would suggest that there are more than 825
drug market murders per year. Id. Without a drug market to spark these murders, this
number could decrease significantly.
92 A tragic example is the death of former University of Maryland basketball star Len
Bias of a cocaine overdose. His friends waited until after his third seizure to call an ambulance, most likely because they feared criminal repercussions. Ostrowski, The Moral and
Practical Case at 669 (cited in note 91).
9'Bandow, 3 Stan L & Policy Rev at 249 (cited in note 14).
See note 90 and accompanying text.
Bandow, 3 Stan L & Policy Rev at 246 (cited in note 14). For a general background
on the Food and Drug Administration and governmental regulation of pharmaceuticals,
see American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Proposals to Reform Drug
Regulation Laws 1-6 (1979).
Church, Time at 14-15 (cited in note 15).
"As long as the mystique surrounds the drug [LSD], the curious will want to try it,
'o
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and many people, especially children and young adults, try them
simply for that reason." Additionally, if drugs were legal, children might confide in parents or other adults about their drug
use." Finally, the illicit drug industry would no longer provide a
lucrative and dangerous place for children to work as drug runners.0 0 Legalization would eliminate both the thrill of illegal
activity and the need for drug runners, removing two strong
incentives for children to become involved with drugs.1 '
Legalizationists hope that decreasing use of drugs in young people would help break the cycle of addiction in American soci10 2
ety.
Overall, any drug legalization policy would attempt to decrease drug abuse and the harmful effects of drug use. While this
Comment does not express an opinion on the value or feasibility
of either these general goals or the more specific ones outlined
above, it does assume that if Congress were to legalize recreational drugs, its actions would be motivated by the above reasons. Therefore, any policy-including patent policy-relating to
recreational drugs following legalization should conform to the
above goals.
B.

Congress, Not the Courts, Should Proscribe Patents on
Legalized Drugs

Legalization implies acceptance and legitimacy.0 3 Regardless of the government's actual purpose in legalizing recreational
drugs, legislation legalizing recreational drugs would remove the
social stigma that such drugs have carried since their
criminalization. People would thus be more likely to try these

and the adepts will orient their lives around it." Richard R. Lingeman, Drugs from A to Z:
A Dictionary 135 (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969).
Douglas N. Husak, Drugs and Rights 55 (Cambridge University Press, 1992).
9 Bandow, 3 Stan L & Policy Rev at 248 (cited in note 14).
'0
Church, Time at 14 (cited in note 15).
101 Merrill A. Smith, The Drug Problem: Is There an Answer?, printed in Evans &
Berent, Forand Against at 77, 85-86 (cited in note 5).
102 See Melvyn B. Krauss and Edward P. Lazear, Searching for Alternatives: Drug
Control Policy in the United States 303, 338 (Hoover Institution Press, 1991).
"o "However loudly Washington might proclaim that it was not condoning narcotics
abuse, the message that would come through on the streets would be 'the Government
says it's O.K.,' and that message would overpower any stepped-up educational efforts
about the dangers of drugs. One peculiar aspect of modem American society is that little
distinction is made between what is legal and what is socially condoned." Church, Time at
16 (cited in note 15).
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drugs, and the recreational drug industry could become difficult

to control.
The patent system provides a method for imposing a check
on this industry. Congress could limit the destigmatizing effect of
legalization by permitting the manufacture and sale of currently
existing recreational drugs but not encouraging the production of
new ones. To this end, Congress could pass legislation legalizing
only "drugs in existence before" a certain date. However, Congress would also desire to encourage the manufacture and sale of
safer recreational drugs. Thus, a date-restricted policy would
contradict Congress's
goal of encouraging the creation of safer
10 4
recreational drugs.
Instead, Congress could simply discourage purely mercenary
research into recreational drugs by eliminating the economic
incentives that the patent system provides. Pharmaceutical companies would be able to develop safer recreational drugs; the
companies simply could not gain monopoly control over these
newly discovered substances.
Alternatively, Congress could avoid the debate over patentability of recreational drugs by instituting a morality clause in
the patent laws, as many other countries have done,0 5 thereby
shifting the issue to the courts.'
Congress should not, however, use this option. Courts are generally reluctant to determine

what is moral.0 7 In fact, the Patent and Trademark Office

1" Additionally, the Food and Drug Administration could treat recreational drugs like
other drugs by regulating their quality and sales. For an explanation of the FDA's drug
approval process, see Beth E. Meyers, The Food and Drug Administration'sExperimental
Drug Approval System: Is It Good For Your Health?, 28 Houston L Rev 309 (1991). The
question of what the FDA will do when recreational drugs are legalized will not be addressed in this Comment, but it deserves mention as a consequence of legalization.
'0'

See note 37 and accompanying text.

The federal trademark system does include a morality clause. "No trademark ... shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature
'o"

unless it--(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; .

. . ."

15

USC § 1052(a) (1974). The inclusion of such a morality clause in the trademark statute,
but not the patent statute, suggests that the drafters of the patent statute wished to
avoid large-scale morality decisions by the patent courts. See U.S. v Azeem, 946 F2d 13,
17 (2d Cir 1991) ("In general, congressional consideration of an issue in one context, but
not another, in the same or similar statutes implies that Congress intends to include that
issue only where it has so indicated.").
1o7Ex parte Murphy, 200 USPQ at 803 ("[W]e think this Office should not be the agency which seeks to enforce a standard of morality with respect to gambling, by refusing, on
the ground of lack of patentable utility, to grant a patent on a game of chance if the requirements of the Patent Act otherwise have been met."). Judge Story's definition of utility, currently used by numerous courts, includes morality considerations. Lowell v Lewis,
15 F Cas at 1019. Morality concerns, however, should not preclude the patenting of recreational drugs. See note 58 and accompanying text. This definition forces the courts to

471]

MONOPOLIES ON ADDICTION

Board of Patent Appeals has expressed concern that the Patent
and Trademark Office might need to make morality judgments
about drugs." 8 Including a general morality clause in the patent laws would introduce morality as a fourth court-determined
requirement for patentability, thus forcing the courts to make
these morality decisions. Therefore, a general morality clause
would not significantly contribute to solving the recreational drug
patentability problem.
Instead, Congress should make these morality decisions by
taking affirmative legislative action to disallow patents on recreational drugs. The morality clause of the EPC refers to "public
morality," 10 9 implying that public opinion is the relevant standard.11 The public, through the electoral process, has already
made its opinion known-in elections."' The public elects people who represent them in expressing their moral and ethical
concerns." 2 The public does not elect regulatory agencies or the
federal judiciary; thus these bodies are not clearly responsible to
any one constituency." 3 Neither can these other bodies provide
the same opportunity for public debate. Therefore, Congress
should determine whether moral considerations preclude the
patentability of recreational drugs.

engage in an examination of morality, but patents are never denied on these grounds
because the courts refuse to make morality decisions.
" Ex parte Murphy, 200 USPQ at 802 ("Or is utility negatived by the mere fact that
the thing in question is sometimes injurious to morals, or to health, or to good order?
[This] hypothesis cannot stand, because if it could, it would be fatal to patents for steam
engines, dynamos, electric railroads, and indeed many of the noblest inventions of the
nineteenth century. (And what of such things as automobiles, airplanes, power tools, explosives, lawn mowers, and drugs in the twentieth century?)").
"'
EPC, Article 53(a) (cited in note 36).
See, for example, G. Liedl, H. Noth and G. Zeitler, Draft Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office 222 (1977) ("A fair test to apply is to consider whether
it is probable that the public in general would regard the invention as so abhorrent that
the grant of patent rights would be inconceivable.").
. See Debates at 22 (cited in note 72) (remarks of Mr. Bangemann).
112 Federalist 49 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers
313, 316
(NAL Penguin, 1961) ("The nature of [the legislature's] public trust implies a personal
influence among the people, and that they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the people.").
.. Id ("The Ijudiciary]; by mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and
permanency of it are far too removed from the people to share much in their prepossession. The ...administration [of the executive] is always liable to be discolored and unpopular.").
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Distinguishing Ethanol and Nicotine from Currently Illicit
Drugs

Some may argue that once legalization legitimizes recreational drugs, the patent laws should treat alcohol, tobacco, and
recreational drugs equally. It then follows that because alcohol
and tobacco products are freely patentable, legal recreational
drug products should be as well. 1 4 On its face, this argument
makes sense. Alcohol was once illegal in the United States and
was legalized, just as currently illicit drugs would be upon legalization. Additionally, both ethanol". and nicotine" 6 are physically and psychologically addictive chemical substances.
Nonetheless, two principal reasons explain why the patent
laws should treat nicotine and alcohol differently than currently
illegal recreational drugs. First, the designer-drug problem highlights a significant difference between ethanol and nicotine, and
other recreational drugs: ethyl alcohol and nicotine are unique in
the effects they produce. No non-toxic analogue of either compound will produce identical or even similar effects." 7 Current-

ly illegal recreational drugs, however, belong to large "families" of
drugs: a simple shift of a carbon or hydrogen atom or a simple
reaction can create an entirely new substance with similar physiological effects."'
Although novel alcohol and tobacco products would be patentable, ethanol and
nicotine themselves are not patentable because they are not novel under 35 USC § 102.
See discussion at notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
1'
Ethanol, or ethyl alcohol, has psychic dependence effects ranging from "miss[ing]
the presence of alcohol at social functions" to being "so obsessed with obtaining alcohol
that [the addict] will go to any lengths to do so and will drink whatever is available, even
poisonous mixtures." Physical dependence is evidenced by the statistic that 10 percent of
all alcohol users are alcoholics. Withdrawal symptoms include common hangovers, convulsions, and hallucinations. Lingeman, Drugs from A to Z at 74 (cited in note 97).
.. Psychologically speaking, nicotine is very addictive. "One hallmark of an addicting
substance is the fact that users seek it continuously, day after day[.] ...The typical pattern of nicotine use ...is not only daily, but hourly." Edward M. Brecher, Licit and Illicit
Drugs 223 (Little, Brown and Company, 1972) (emphasis in original). Although it was
once commonly thought that nicotine was not physically addictive, symptoms such as nervousness, drowsiness, anxiety, cramps, insomnia, and palpitations occur upon withdrawal
from nicotine use. Id at 225.
..
7 Alcoholics, when desperate for alcohol, will occasionally ingest methanol, isopropanol, and ethylene glycol if they cannot obtain ethanol. When ingested, or even applied to
the skin, these substances can cause poisoning. Moreover, ingesting such substitutes is a
popular method of committing suicide. Keith K. Burkhart and Kenneth W. Kulig, The
Other Alcohols: Methanol, Ethylene Glycol, and Isopropanol, 8 Emergency Medicine Clinics of N Am Number 4 913, 913-14 (Nov 1990).
'18The very structure of drug statutes suggests the ease with which certain drugs can
be "invented around." See notes 42-44 and accompanying text. For example, crack, or rock
cocaine, is produced by combining cocaine hydrochloride (powder cocaine) with water and
11
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Because existing drugs and drug families are easily modifiable, the patentability of recreational drugs is particularly disturbing. Ease of modification, combined with the economic incentive to effect these modifications, would likely result in a flood of
new products available to consumers.11 9 Nicotine and ethanol
products do not present this concern because they cannot be
modified in the same way. Therefore, nicotine and ethanol differ
from recreational drugs due to the difference in public policy
concerns.
Second, the psychological and physiological effects of these
drugs are wildly different. Ethanol, in its myriad recreational

forms, may be consumed occasionally and in moderation with few
undesirable effects.120 In fact, ethanol use may yield some beneficial effects.12 ' While nicotine has "unpleasant side effects" to
which a user must become accustomed before experiencing pleasurable effects, these effects are minimal. 22 Both substances
may act as tranquilizers, stimulants, or depressants.'23
On the other hand, neither drug is a narcotic or hallucinogen. Neither drug impairs mental acuity when taken in moderation. 24 Neither one causes the "pseudohallucinations" of mescaline or peyote;'25 the "stimulant-induced psychosis" of cocaine
and amphetamines; 2 6 the hallucinations of psilocybin, LSD,
and other hallucinogens;"' or the psychotic episodes of

sodium bicarbonate, thereby removing the hydrogen chloride group from the cocaine molecule and precipitating out the rock cocaine. See United States v Shaw, 936 F2d 412, 414
(9th Cir 1991). The resultant "crack" has a lower melting point and is therefore
smokeable, allowing absorption of the narcotic into the bloodstream much faster than
powder cocaine, which is generally snorted. Id.
"' Of course, to be patentable these compounds must pass the non-obviousness test of
35 USC § 103. See note 33 and accompanying text.
"~ Brecher, Licit and Illicit Drugs at 245 (cited in note 116).
121 See, for example, Alcohol and Cold Risk, NY Times C14 (Oct 20, 1993) (reporting
a
study which shows that "alcohol may foster resistance to the common cold"); Dolores
Kong, Study Cites Alcohol's Role in Lowering Heart Attack Risk, Boston Globe 3 (Dec 16,
1993) (reporting a study showing that drinking one to two drinks per day lowers the incidence of heart disease); Sharon Loh, Reconsider Age Limit, Straits Times 4 (Aug 4, 1993)
(reporting a study showing that one to two drinks per day may benefit learning and reasoning skills in later life).
1
Brecher, Licit and Illicit Drugs at 224 (cited in note 116).
'
Id at 207, 245.
124 Gabriel G. Nahas, The Decline of Drugged Nations, as printed in Evans & Berent,
For and Against at 247-48 (cited in note 5).
2
National Clearinghouse for Drug Abuse Information Report Series, Ser 15, No 1,
Mescaline 7 (1973). Pseudo-hallucinations are alterations in a person's perception that the
person realizes have no basis in reality. Id.
1
Redda, Cocaine, Marijuana,DesignerDrugs at 76 (cited in note 42).
"
National Clearinghouse for Drug Abuse Information Report Series, Ser 16, No 1,
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PCP. 2 ' Neither is generally as instantly dangerous as cocaine,
which is physically addictive on the first dose, or LSD, which can
cause recurrence of the effects of a "trip," or "flashbacks," even
after use is discontinued.'2 9
D.

The Pharmaceutical Industry

1. The economics of the pharmaceuticalindustry.
In the United States, private industry produces most pharmaceutical innovations.3 ° Studies have shown that a company
will undertake research and development ("R & D") in the areas
that it deems either most profitable or most likely to provide the
highest return with the least investment. 3 '
The pharmaceutical industry heavily depends upon patent
protection to maintain its R & D incentives and profits.3 2 A
1986 study by Edwin Mansfield showed that in the early 1980s,
60 percent of pharmaceuticals developed and 65 percent of
pharmaceuticals introduced in the United States would not have
been developed or introduced in the absence of patent protection. 3 Because disallowing patent protection for recreational
drugs would significantly lower the profit margin from the development of new recreational drugs, denying this protection could
decrease the number of new recreational drugs introduced into
the marketplace.'

Psilocybin 3-4 (1973).

" National Clearinghouse for Drug Abuse Information Report Series, Ser 14, No 1,
Phencyclidine (PCP)3 (1973).
Lingeman, Drugs from A to Z at 130 (cited in note 97).
1' From 1960 to 1969, 91 percent of all new drugs introduced in the United States
were discovered and developed by private industry. Office of Technology Assessment,
'"

Patent-Term Extension and the PharmaceuticalIndustry 16 (1981). The other 9 percent
were the product of universities, non-profit enterprises, and governmental research.
"' Id at 18. The emphasis on profit is evidenced by the current lack of production of

"orphan drugs"--those drugs that are medically important but financially unprofitable.

See Carolyn H. Asbury, Orphan Drugs: Medical versus Market Value 2 (D.C. Heath and

Co., 1985).
132

Julio Nogu~s, Patents and PharmaceuticalDrugs: Understandingthe Pressureson

Developing Countries 11-14 (World Bank Policy Research and External Affairs Working
Papers 502, 1990).
133 Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 2 Management
Science 32 (Feb 1986), reprinted in Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property, Technology

and Economic Growth, printed in Rushing & Brown, Intellectual Property Rights at 17, 25
(cited in note 26).
" Office of Technology Assessment, Patent-Term Extension at 49 (cited in note 130)

("[Rlesearch-intensive pharmaceutical firms consider patent protection as a prerequisite to
innovation.").
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Upon legalization of recreational drugs, pharmaceutical companies would have great incentive to take the first step and enter
the market, selling their own varieties of non-novel, and therefore unpatentable, currently available illicit substances. Because
the two prerequisites of a good R & D prospect-high prospective
demand and ability to create an innovative product'S5-would
be present in a legal recreational drug market, the second step
would likely follow: assuming the availability of patent protection, the companies would develop their own new kinds of novel
recreational drugs, 3 ' thereby
increasing the number of recre37
ational drugs available.
If pharmaceutical companies were to create new addictive
recreational drugs and people were to experiment with them,
these companies would have an addicted group of consumers. The
demand for these products would become "inelastic" because the
consumer's desire for the item would not vary with the price of
the good.'38 While elastic demand causes demand to decrease as
price increases, consumers of goods with an inelastic demand,
such as addictive recreational drugs, would purchase the goods at
almost any price.'
Furthermore, patent protection creates an artificial monopoly
that allows patentees to increase their price beyond marginal
cost. " Monopoly-inflated prices, combined with the addictive
nature of recreational drugs, would possibly lead to the rebirth of
a black market. Addicted consumers would seek the cheapest
drugs possible, and they would purchase these drugs from illicit
sellers if necessary. Because the black market 4 can supply

'
'
137

See generally Asbury, Orphan Drugs at 1-5 (cited in note 131).
See Nogu~s, Patents and PharmaceuticalDrugs at 11-14 (cited in note 132).
An example of this phenomenon was the explosion of Rubik's Cube variations and

other hand-held puzzles developed after the original Rubik's Cube hit the market. See'
Mark Roman, Rubik's Cube: Ideal Toy Takes on the Knock-Offs, NY Times 3-21 (Oct 4,
1981); Andrew and Janet Gallant, Diversions; Perplexing Puzzles, Washington Post B5
(Dec 1, 1988).
1
Elkins, 32 BC L Rev at 578 (cited in note 90). But see Gary S. Becker and Kevin
M. Murphy, A Theory of RationalAddiction, 96 J Pol Econ 675 (1988) (arguing that higher prices will prevent some people from starting to use drugs, so not all drug demand is
inelastic).
1
Elkins, 32 BC L Rev at 578 (cited in note 90). See also Steven Wisotsky, Exposing
the War on Cocaine: The Futility and Destructivenessof Prohibition, 1983 Wis L Rev 1305,
1395 (noting that demand for cocaine is likely to be inelastic).
14 Abbott, Developing a Framework at 318 (cited in note 26). Marginal cost is the cost
of developing an additional unit of a good. Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 32
(cited in note 26).
' The black market would be different in this post-legalization world-the laws that
the black market would violate would not be criminal drug laws but civil patent laws.
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poorer quality products at lower prices, the black market could
find a viable place in a world where recreational drugs are pat4
entable. 1
Inelasticity of demand for recreational drugs concerns commentators who study patent policies for various countries. For
example, in examining Canadian patent policy, Yehuda Kotowitz
states:
The nature of demand in the [pharmaceutical] industry
is different than in most industries .... First, demand
for many drugs may be highly inelastic allowing very
high mark-ups over cost. The monopoly awarded by
patent rights is therefore more valuable to the innovator and may lead to lower social benefits relative to
the innovator's profits under certain circumstances.
Patent policy must take account of this possibility. 4 3
In summary, if pharmaceutical companies could gain patents
on recreational drugs in a post-legalization world, then they
would have great incentive to develop highly addictive compounds in order to take advantage of the inelastic demand created by addicted consumers. Because the pharmaceutical industry
depends on patent protection to justify large R & D expenditures,
disallowing patents on recreational drugs would likely dampen
pharmaceutical companies' enthusiasm for developing new substances.
2. Denying patent protection would further the goals of
legalization.
Opening a new area of potentially lucrative research could
increase the number of new drugs in the marketplace-a prospect we may not desire. Some legalizationists argue that if market forces were allowed to shape the recreational drug industry,
then the new drugs developed would be safer than those available today; therefore, the incentive that patents provide would

2

Interestingly enough, the character of the black market would change drastically.

Because it would be legal to purchase the drugs in stores, black market dealers would
compete based on low prices, altering the drugs available in stores in order to make a
profit. This possible universe radically differs from today's world, where chemical companies can produce illicit drugs for pennies, but where the black market sells them for ex-

orbitant prices. Additionally, if the government were to place limits on who may purchase
drugs, those individuals unable to obtain drugs legally, such as children, would purchase

them on the black market.
143

Kotowitz, Issue in PatentPolicy at 18 (cited in note 26).
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function as a public service. 114 "Safer" drugs, however, are not

necessarily better. The availability of a cleaner, faster, and higher "high" could transform America into the "nation of zombies"
forecast by Senator D'Amato and the anti-legalizationists"'
The question becomes one of line drawing: for every research
trail that leads to a safer drug, others might lead to more dangerous drugs. Patent incentives for recreational drugs would not
distinguish between these two categories, nor would a researcher
know beforehand whether the resulting drug would be more or
less dangerous. Thus, the patent system inherently cannot promote "safer" drugs without also promoting more dangerous
ones. 146

Moreover, companies would be less inclined to develop physically non-addictive drugs than addictive drugs. In large part, a
company's incentive in the recreational drug market would be to
create a permanent, necessity-based consumer demand for the
product. 147 Under a system in which recreational drugs were
patentable, pharmaceutical companies would possess the only
product in the market satisfying the particular need. Significantly, a monopoly in addictive drugs is far more useful than an ordinary patent monopoly: consumers, once addicted, cannot truly
decide not to purchase the product. Pharmaceutical companies
would have the incentive to create the most addictive drugs possible to gain the most financial benefit from their patents.
If recreational drugs were patentable in a post-legalization
world, a new area of innovation would open in which chemists
could experiment without fear of criminal sanction.'48 The likely
chain of events following legalization is clear: first, each pharma-

See Bandow, 3 Stan L & Policy Rev at 247 (cited in note 14).
...See note 15 and accompanying text.
"4 Although the Food and Drug Administration could regulate dangerous recreational
drugs, previous experience teaches that regulation based solely on FDA approval is usually expensive and time-consuming. See note 104.
147 Not all drugs currently available through the black market are physically addictive, although most are psychologically addictive, or habituating. For example, physically
addictive drugs include sedatives (including barbiturates), narcotics (including heroin,
morphine, and opium), select tranquilizers, and stimulants in large doses. Habituating
drugs include marijuana, hashish, amphetamines, hallucinogens (including LSD, mescaline, psilocybin,-and peyote), and cocaine. See Lingeman, Drugs From A to Z (cited in note
97).
48 This argument has been made in the context of anti-interdiction: if we completely
eliminate foreign drug imports, "[slynthetic drugs would take over within two months." In
other words, creation of a market for synthetic drugs would certainly breed new synthetic
drugs. See Bandow, 3 Stan L & Policy Rev at 247 (cited in note 14), quoting Report from
the Field on an Endless War, NY Times E9 (Mar 12, 1989).
144
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ceutical company would rush to market its own brand-name
versions of the newly legalized drugs. Next, each company would
funnel large amounts of time and money into its new "Recreational Drug Division," attempting to find a new class of compounds with better, faster, and cleaner highs and fewer side
effects. Finally, as such drugs were discovered, they would be
patented, tested, and marketed, finding their way into the
mouths, noses, and veins of consumers everywhere.
Although pharmaceutical companies would not deserve
blame simply for trying to make money, 149 the question remains
whether a world in which legalized recreational drugs are patentable is desirable. As companies began to spend money and time
on recreational drug research, they would spend less time and
money on more complicated, more time- and money-consuming,
and less potentially lucrative research in areas such as cures for
AIDS, 50 Alzheimer's disease, and cancer. 5 ' While it is unlikely that pharmaceutical companies would abandon such efforts entirely, it is likely that they would cut the riskiest, least-lucrative
areas of their research budgets first in order to move more money
to the profitable recreational drugs area. Pharmaceutical companies would not have the same incentive to spend great amounts
of time and money to develop new drugs, however, if they could
not gain patent protection for these products.'5 2
Thus, a world in which legalized drugs are patentable would
not further the goals of legalization. Indeed, the result would be
a world where drugs would be more addictive and less safe,
where research on more socially beneficial drugs would suffer,

The pharmaceutical industry is currently struggling with rising costs and decreasing profits resulting from the ever-increasing cost of developing a patentable drug and
winning FDA approval. See John Carey, A Bitter Tonic For Drugmakers?, Business Week
84 (Mar 8, 1993). In 1991, to develop a new drug, test it, and market it in the United
States cost approximately $245 million and took ten years. Jane H. Cutaia, 1992 Will Be
Easy to Swallow, Business Week 102 (Jan 13, 1992). Given this exorbitant expense, it is
logical that pharmaceutical companies could seek projects that give the greatest return on
investment, such as recreational drugs.
150 In 1985, the FDA approved the drug isoprinosine for use on AIDS patients. The
cost of compliance with FDA regulations was more than $2,000 per patient. This cost prevented the manufacturer from introducing the drug into the marketplace. Lisa C. Will,
Accelerated FDA Approval of Investigational New Drugs: Hope for Seriously Ill Patients,
94 Dick L Rev 1037, 1046 (1990).
,51 Such a phenomenon already exists in the area of "orphan drugs"-drugs with valid
(and often very important) medical uses, but with little or no financial value to a drug
company. See note 131 and accompanying text.
,52 Stanley M. Besen, New Technologies and Intellectual Property:An Economic Analysis 7 (National Science Foundation, 1987). See notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
149
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and where a black market would still thrive. This Comment has
asserted, however, that these ills are not the result of a legalization regime itself, but of patentability accompanying legalization.
Thus, if Congress chooses to legalize recreational drugs, it should
make them unpatentable.
CONCLUSION

Although legalization of purely recreational drugs may never
become a reality in the United States, legalization legislation
could be proposed in the near future. The speculative nature of
the legalization debate, however, does not give the advocates and
enemies of legalization license to ignore a serious question of the
post-legalization world. The proponents of all sides in the recreational drug legalization debate have argued the issues for years;
they should now examine the issue of patentability as a further
obstacle to a legalization regime.
When deciding whether to legalize recreational drugs, Congress must consider the ramifications of patentability. If Congress, through legalization, truly wishes to strive for elimination
of black markets, drug-related crime, and extremely high rates of
addiction, especially among young people, then it must not provide the pharmaceutical industry with a powerful incentive to
undermine these goals. Therefore, legalized recreational drugs
should not be patentable.

